Chapter Five
VAJPAYEE AND CHINA

The “Handshake across the Himalayas”:
Vajpayee and China

We want peace, life is a dear possession,
We want peace, our priority is creation
Our war is against hunger and disease,
Let every man give us a helping hand.
We won’t let our lush, green earth be bloodied.
We shall not allow war.
(Translated from “We Shall Not Allow War”)

The first half of the twentieth century marked the rise of two of the world’s most populous countries, China and India. India achieved independence from Britain in 1947, and became the world’s largest and most linguistically diverse democracy under Prime Minister Nehru. China, however, faced years of Imperial control, feudal wars, aggression by Japanese forces over Manchuria and fierce civil war following World War II. During the period of civil war, 1947-1949, the Chinese communist partydefeated Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalist government and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. China, under Chairman Mao Zedong’s leadership, embraced communism as a societal foundation and political system. Although the forms of ideology differed,India and China had common objectives, upon which an alliance could be built. Both countries sought to develop independently, without foreign support. Nehru firmly believed that

firmly believed that, by neither China nor India being aligned with the United States nor the Soviet Union, the two countries could form a strategic partnership, and lead the way for a ‘resurgent Asia’. The fact that both adopted a socialist approach towards achieving economic development, based on a planned economy, not global markets, would serve as a strong foundation for the partnership.

In the mid-seventies, when the Cold War was at its peak and superpower politics was dominating international relations, Asian politics underwent a dynamic change. In the initial phase of nation-building, Nehru’s foreign policy was driven by the principle of Non-Alignment. He wished to remain neutral in the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. However, maintain this stance was proving difficult in light of India’s relationship with Pakistan deteriorating. China and the US would side with Pakistan, and India would form an alliance with the Soviet Union. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Pakistan’s military dictators, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, reinforced their relationship with China and requested military aid during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. China again openly helped Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. As a response to improving relations between Pakistan and China, not to mention the US and China, India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971. China responded to the Indo-Soviet treaty, by pursuing a policy of rapprochement towards the US. Years later, in 1977, Vajpayee became India’s External Minister. Having

witnessed the cold war from its beginning, Vajpayee understood the dynamics at play, and wanted to avoid any further conflicts with China. To do so would risk the security of both India and Asia.

As a young member of parliament, he had closely witnessed India’s diplomatic nightmare during the 1962 war with China. This was a driving factor in his constant endorsement of India’s nuclear program and increases in India’s military budget. However, despite the bitterness, he would, as Prime Minister, take progressive steps towards resolving the border, and other outstanding issues, peacefully. A Beijing newspaper, China Economic Times (Zhongguo Jingji Shibao), praised Vajpayee as “a pragmatic statesman” who “swept away an important barrier in Indo-China relations.” Vajpayee’s initiatives, called the “handshake across the Himalayas,” resolved tensions and ushered in a new age in Sino-Indian relations.

Origins of the Border Conflict
On December 30th 1949, only three months after the Peoples’ Republic of China was established; India became the second non-communist country to acknowledge the new Republic.

In midst of this optimistic, fresh start for both countries, boarders had to be reaffirmed. India wanted to keep the land it had held as part of the British Empire, so it accepted the de facto borders that had previously been established by the Johnson and McMahon Lines.Nehru made a statement in Lok

Sabha that “So far as I am concerned, our frontier from Burma border right upto the Bhutan border is the McMohan Line; we hold by that.” This meant that India exercised its sovereignty over Aksai Chin in the north, Assam, Sikkim and a part of the Himalayas called the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA; present-day Arunachal Pradesh) in the east.

However, when China claimed Tibet as its territory and brought it under Chinese political control in 1951, India’s position towards China was forced to change. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, under Prime Minister Nehru, feared that China had imperialistic intentions. Tibet was seen as a significant ‘buffer state’ between China and India – China’s claim was widely perceived a threat to India’s boarders.

Source: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/16843717

China began publishing maps that showed the claimed area as laying within Chinese borders. India had serious objections to this. As seen through a comparison of maps from this time, each nation depicted what it felt were the historically established borders. India held that its borders were based on the previous, British imperial rule. China, however, rejected all of the borders imposed by the European imperialists and during the rule of the Nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek government. Instead, China sought to redefine the national boundaries. The Chinese saw Nehru’s acceptance of the colonial boundaries as hypocritical. China contested that Nehru waged a struggle against the British Empire, but was now using Western, imperial claims to define India’s territories. To China, these paradoxes cast doubt on Nehru’s commitment to a “resurgent Asia.”

Nehru wanted to avoid military conflict between the two countries. Aside from the possible economic damage, Nehru did not want to detract from what he felt were more pressing issues for India, such as stable economic growth. Despite parliamentary pressures to act against China, Nehru abstained from directly responding to China, not wanting to confront the border issue. In a diplomatic note to Premier Zhou, Nehru criticized China’s action and termed China’s steps as ‘inappropriate’.Then, so as not to anger Chinese leaders, he accepted Zhou’s reply that “the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of China” and continued to support China at an international level. This support was most clearly shown when Nehru lobbied for the PRC’s seat in the United Nations. He argued that it was in India’s interest to have good relations with its geographically larger and more populous

neighbor. have good relations with its geographically larger and more populous neighbor.In 1954, Nehru traveled to China to reiterate his support for the PRC. On April 29, 1954, he and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India more commonly known as the Panchsheel Agreement (five restraints).Nehru recognized that a lasting agreement on the border issue was necessary to prevent conflict. Panchsheel laid out a framework for future cooperation between India and China. Its preamble included,the “Five Principles,” which called for:

Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence.

Nehru and Zhou vowed to uphold these principles while building stronger relations and acting as leaders to newly liberated developing countries. Nehru was optimistic that the close ties and cooperation espoused by the agreement would finally provide the basisfor a “resurgent Asia,” ensuring astrong and peaceful Asian voice on the world stage.

Despite the Panchsheel Agreement, both India and China continued to disagree on the border issue. Just a few months after signing Panchsheel, Nehru commissioned

new maps of India that included Aksai Chin as Indian territory. In turn, in the mid-1950’s, China began constructing the National Highway 219 in Aksai Chin, a military road linking Tibet with the Chinese province of Xinjiang. India had not paid much attention to the remote region and only discovered the Chinese road when it was featured on a 1958 map published by China’s official magazine, China Pictorial. This map claimed Aksai Chin, as well as the NEFA (North Eastern Frontier Agency) as part of China. Nehru publicly rejected the map and the military road through Aksai Chin, but was still reluctant to seek conflict. Just a few months after signing Panchsheel, Nehru commissioned new maps of India that included Aksai Chin as an Indian territory.

Relations were further strained by events in Tibet. In 1956, Buddhist monks, agitated by China’s land redistribution policy, rebelled. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China swung into action to tackle the 1959 uprising, while the Dalai Lama fled to India. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), the organization co-founded by Vajpayee,demanded that India ally itself with the U.S. to free Tibet from Chinese expansionism. However, Nehru sought to remain neutral, assuring China that the Dalai Lama would not be accorded political support. Despite his efforts, China accused India of interfering in its domestic affairs. Both countries erected more border posts as tensions eroded the goodwill from the Panchsheel Agreement. Since the borders had never been bilaterally demarcated to begin with, the stage was set for the armed conflict that Nehru had tried to avoid.

On October 20, 1959 a confrontation in Kongka La, Aksai Chin, resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers and the capture of seven others. Public opinion in India expressed outrage against China, and Nehru was blamed for the government’s inaction toward China. Twenty-five year-old Vajpayee, a rising figure in the BJS, led the opposition in demanding Nehru to release a White Paper documenting all government contact with China. Facing increasing pressure from the public, the Congress government conceded and published the white paper. Once published, Parliament was stunned by the extent of China’s territorial claims and Nehru’s inaction. To BJS party members, such as Vajpayee, India’s security was at stake. Indian public opinion, as expressed in the media, accused China of expanding its borders.

Faced with increased anti-China sentiment following the release of the White Papers, Nehru was obliged to act. His first measure was termed the “Forward Policy,” which involved the placement of Indian troops in military posts within the disputed areas. His second step was to invite Zhou to Delhi for negotiations. However, many in the BJS feared that negotiations would cost India some of its territory, and a protest was held in front of Nehru’s home just five days before the Chinese premier arrived.

On October 10, the PLA surprised Indian soldiers with an attack in the NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). While the PLA had trucks and automatic rifles, the Indian Army moved by foot using World War-I era rifles. Nehru asked

for and received military support from the United States, going against his desire for India to remain independent. The Indo-China War of 1962 lasted six weeks, ultimately ending in Chinese victory as a ceasefire was declared on November 20. China kept Aksai Chin and gave the NEFA (which later became the state of Arunachal Pradesh) to India, and both sides retreated 20 kilometers behind what was called the Line of Actual Control, the line that continues to serve as the India-China border today.

The conflict of 1962 was a serious setback for India; having lost men, territory, and prestige. Nehru was leftembarrassed. Accepting the annexation of Tibet, supporting China internationally, and pledging to cooperate for “peaceful coexistence” ultimately failed to prevent war. Nehru’s hope for a “resurgent Asia” had collapsed, as did his aim to keep India independent from the superpowers. For many, and especially for nationalists like Vajpayee, it marked a low point in national pride. India might have been independent, but it had a long way to go before it could be seen as an economically and militarily advanced country.

The border conflict would inspireVajpayee to begin his political career and eventually become prime minister. After Vajpayee assumed office, he decided to re-define India’s security position. He called upon Abdul Kalam, then chief scientist of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO),and asked about the possible time needed for the nuclear tests. In response, Kalam answered “T-minus thirty days” – only thirty days” – only thirty days

were needed to prepare. Vajpayee’s swift approval of the tests was preceded by decades of deliberation on the issue; as a Member of Parliament, a Minister of External Affairs, president of the BJP, and eventually as Prime Minister.

Following the 1962 war, China conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964. Vajpayee knew the danger it could pose to India and the subcontinent. In this context, Vajpayee led the BJS in calling for a motion in Lok Sabha to support the development of nuclear weapons in India. The motion failed but Vajpayee received much public attention and support. Vajpayee entered Parliament at the age of 32. His first term in Lok Sabha saw him forcefully taking part in debates on issues of national security and foreign policy, which highlighted the Tibetan issue and tensions with China. Fear of China’s nuclear capabilities, led Vajpayee to reform India’s China policy. In his second term, as a member of Rajya Sabha, he vehemently argued, “What is the answer to the Atom bomb? The answer to the atom bomb is atom bomb, nothing else. If the government says there are difficulties in manufacturing the atom bomb because our economic condition is not good, because we have to develop our country and therefore, we cannot utilize our resources for manufacturing an atom bomb, then I am prepared to think about these arguments, but do not talk of morality, non-violence and Gandhiji.” With China’s detonation of the bomb signifying their nuclear status, Vajpayee asserted that India needed nuclear capabilities as well to counter China.

The Indo-China War gave China and Pakistan a common enemy, India, and a reason for the two countries to cooperate. Beginning in 1965, Pakistan received a large amount of Chinese aid, taking the form of money, missiles, and nuclear technology. Furthermore, China’s geographic proximity to Pakistan would influence Pakistan’s attack on India. Prior to 1962, India intended to prevent China from engaging militarily with Pakistan.

The urge to develop nuclear technology increased over time, and in 1974, Operation Smiling Buddha, approved by Nehru’s daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, marked India’s entry into the nuclear community. After the nuclear explosion, Vajpayee praised Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and urged the government to keep pursuing the nuclear program. The first nuclear tests in 1974 did bring some strategic value to India, but could not halt the Sino-Pak entente, which, to a large extent, was built on a suspicion of India.

The 1970’s was a period of change for both China and India. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China underwent economic reforms and sought greater external relations as a way to enhance its growth and stability.In India, the fall of the Congress Party government in the 1977 elections and the victory of the Janata government were seen as a ‘welcome change’.Internationally, the Chinese were also happy to see a shift in power, prospecting new efforts for diplomacy. Wang Bingnan, Head of the Chinese people’s Association for Friendship with Foreign countries, visited

India in March 1978 to discuss when formal border talks could be initiated with the new government. Following this visit, Vajpayee met with the Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua at the United Nations in September 1978. In February 1979, Vajpayee, then the Minister of External Affairs, made his first trip to China to take advantage of China’s reopening. Relaxing his previously hard-line stance against China, he asserted that India’s foreign policy should be “capable of replying to changing situations in the world”. Nobody expected a major breakthrough in the longstanding border conflict; Vajpayee himself called the trip a “probing mission”. Still, the visit was acknowledged by both sides as a change from the past and a possible step forward. According to Cheng Ruisheng, the former Chinese ambassador to New Delhi, the boundary dispute in 1962 led to mutual distrust and bilateral relations remained stagnant until Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited China in 1979.

While the “probing mission” did not solve the core conflicts between the two countries, Vajpayee did achieve some positive results. He was able to procure pilgrimage rights for Indians to Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar, holy Hindu sites located in Tibet. Even China’s pro-Pakistan stance, which was “an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Indo-China relations,” was addressed. The next year, Deng publicly called the Kashmir conflict a “bilateral dispute,” thereby lessening its overwhelming support for Pakistan.Vajpayee also tried to bring in the north-eastern insurgency in the talks

with the Chinese. Upon Vajpayee’s objections to Chinese involvement in supplying arms to Mizo and Naga insurgents, the Chinese provided him assurances. Unfortunately, progress during the visit was halted when China suddenly invaded Vietnam on February 17, 1979. This action came as a surprise and an embarrassment to India, and Vajpayee canceled the rest of the trip out of protest. His departure marked the last time a high-level Indian representative would visit China for nearly a decade.

Even though China’s Vietnam War suddenly ended this positive trend, Vajpayee had significantly improved Sino-Indian relations. Furthermore, it is widely agreed, that the attack was to counter Soviet influence in the nation, not demean India. Just a few weeks before Vajpayee’s visit to China, Deng traveled to Burma and Nepal to seek further alliances for China. Deng even praised the Indian initiative during his meeting with Vajpayee in the Great Hall of People on February 14, 1979. While speaking on this occasion he told Vajpayee, “We do have some issues on which we are far apart. We should put those on the side for the moment and do some actual work to improve the climate to go about the problem. Our two countries are the two most populous countries in the world, and we are both Asian countries. How can we not be friends?” He expressed that the war and subsequent border disputes were an “unfortunate period” and further claimed “in 1970 our Chairman Mao said we should work for improvement of relations with India. The process was delayed because of certain factors on your side and internal factors on our side also.The 'Gang of Four' was

running wild then and there, resulting into instability in China. Now we can brook no further delay. We should speed up our relations.”

India’s recognition of the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin Government in Cambodia caused some uneasiness for China. India’s support for Vietnam was based on the principle of non-alignment. As a result when China attacked Vietnam in 1979, the Indian government saw this as a sign of contempt. While speaking on this in Rajya Sabha on February 20, 1979, Vajpayee explained his act as a response to “profound shock and distress at the outbreak of hostilities which could endanger international peace and security.” However, for Vajpayee, it was a decision that was taken after considering the long-term impact. Had Vajpayee not left China in protest, it would have underlined India’s acceptance of the attack. During his discussions with Chinese leadership, Vajpayee had cautioned China about the adverse effects of any such conflict. He later maintained in Rajya Sabha, “I had even then expressed our concern at the possibility of deterioration of the situation and its dangerous consequences. I sought to impress on the Chinese leaders that any escalation would be serious and urged that the problem should be solved peacefully through negotiations. I added that the aggravation of tensions in an already complex situation could be a setback to stability in South-East Asia and endanger international relations in general.” India’s passiveness would have done damage beyond repair. Though Vajpayee’s return was criticized by some ,parties

in India, it did not contradict India’s policy towards China. China could have either averted the attack or simply have stalled it until Vajpayee had left.

Rajiv Gandhi’s forward-looking China Policy
In 1986, after border clashes again broke out in Arunachal Pradesh, Deng Xiaoping warned India that consequences would follow. Rajiv Gandhi took the message seriously and called for intense, bilateral discussions to resolve the crisis. These proved surprisingly fruitful. A ‘long handshake’ instilled confidence in both sets of the public that another war could be avoided, and even that cooperation could perhaps be increased. Rajiv Gandhi and Deng made remarkable progress, re-emphasizing the Five Principles of Panchsheel, and committing to more bilateral cooperation. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in December 1988, producing two joint working groups specifically for the border issues, calling for increased trade and cultural exchange, and agreeing to cooperate in civil aviation, science, and technology. For Indo-China relations, this was a definite breakthrough. While it still did not answer the border question, it fostered closer ties.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit provided a strong foundation on which his successors could build. Relations continued to improve in 1993, when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao went to China and signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It required both sides to respect the LAC and to reduce troop levels. These measures moved the discussion towards

Gandhi’s initiatives of addressing the border issue. This was followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC, which called for further troop reductions and a pledge to not use military force against the other side. Knowing that the border issue would be difficult to resolve, the countries hoped that, in case the border talks would collapse this would at least prevent military conflict.

As the nation witnessed Rajiv Gandhi’s progressive ideas to modernize India, Vajpayee was impressed by his non-partisan views on foreign policy issues. On various occasions Vajpayee endorsed his policy of reconciliation. He termed Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China as a ‘landmark journey’ and a ‘path breaking’ visit that revived the relations between India and China. Vajpayee could also recall Deng's words to Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 that India and China need to first develop themselves if the twenty-first century was to be considered an Asian century. Vajpayee reiterated this sentiment at his St Petersburg meeting with Hu Jintao. Vajpayee shared good understanding with Deng and by underlining the significance of the Deng-Rajiv visit, he tried to resonate with Chinese leaders. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit turned the channel of communication between the two countries in a more constructive direction.

Vajpayee's China Policy
When Vajpayee became Prime Minister in 1998, India and China faced difficulties on how to structure the

relationship. While China saw Vajpayee’s election as an opportunity for a fresh start, Vajpayee made it a priority to assert India's status as a global power. This would be best reached through nuclear technology. While nuclear developments would not put India at par with China, it would be a step in that direction. In one of his dialogues with Sudheendra Kulkarni, an important confidant, Vajpayee expressed; “Hiroshima convinced me that the world respects only the strong and has no patience for the weak.” China was a long-time member of the nuclear weapons club; for India to join would be a way of playing "catch-up." On May 11, 1998, twenty-four years after India’s first nuclear test (Pokhran I), the Atomic Energy Commission and Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) carried out Pokhran II.

Pokhran II strained relations with China. Although, China did not necessarily perceive India as a grave threat, given its larger, more advanced military and more extensive nuclear stockpile, it created what Vajpayee had hoped - the realization that India could be and was developing into a global power. Chinese leaders were also angered by a letter that Vajpayee wrote to President Clinton shortly after the detonation. It was sent in private, but was leaked to the New York Times. Though the letter did not explicitly mention China, it implied Chinesehostility as a rationale for the tests:
We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust

persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem- that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state.

The comments by India’s Defense Minister George Fernandez made China furious. Fernandez referred to China as India’s “threat number one”. In response, China sided with the US in condemning the nuclear tests. While China did not respond militarily, it used its rising status in the global arena to remind India that it still had plenty of catching up to do. Holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council at the time, China promoted Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests in both India and Pakistan. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, called India’s action “a hard blow . . . [that] will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the world at large.”

Vajpayee had succeeded in getting China to recognize India as an important global player. However, he understood that further agitating China was not in India’s best interest. This could encourage China to take Pakistan’s side, making potential nuclear fallout more likely. Vajpayee did not want to alienate China and undo the achievements that had essentially started with his visit in 1979.He initiated diplomatic efforts to mitigate the situation.He dispatched Jaswant Singh to Beijing in July 1999, and consulted closely with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra,a China expert who made a strong effort to assure the Chinese that India did not see it as an

enemy. The joint working groups soon resumed, and the two countries recommitted themselves to cooperation. In a May 2000 visit to China, President K. R. Narayanan, along with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, launched the first bilateral security dialogue between the two countries. This was followed by two moredialogues in 2001 and 2002, all of which aimed to discuss ways to promote global and regional security in Asia. This marked a shift from distrustful rivals to actively cooperating partners. Jiang and Narayanan also initiated a bilateral ‘Eminent Persons Group,’ consisting of scientists,scholars, and diplomats from both sides, who strived to recommend ways to reduce any potential hostility.

The various dialogues and activities were an effort to replace past hostilities with more constructive methods for establishing peace. However, the crucial bridge builder was trade. New trade deals bolstered economic ties, creating a mutual interest that Vajpayee saw as mitigating the risk of conflict. In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to $265 million; in 2001, three years after the Pokhran fallout, that figure was at $3.6 billion, with an increase of just over 23% in 2000-2001 alone.

Today, Sino-Indian trade has reached striking volumes. According to a Deloitte report, the bilateral trade (between China and India) is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015, from $61.74 billion in 2010. In the first six months of this year, the trade between the two nations has already crossed $35 billion. As a result of growing trade between these two countries, according to Assocham (The Associated Chambers

of Commerce and Industry of India), India is the tenth largest trade partner of China, and its seventh largest export market.

Mutual economic interests fostered an environment in which progress could be made towards resolving the more complex border issue. This was the central focus of Vajpayee’s second visit to China. Almost twenty-five years after his visit to China as Minister of External Affairs, Vajpayee returned to China for an official six-day trip in 2003. The magnitude of Vajpayee’s visit was immediately acknowledged. The newspaper China Daily hailed Vajpayee’s visit as “a handshake across the Himalayas.” It demonstrated a significant improvement in bilateral relations and set a strong base for future cooperation. During the visit, Vajpayee, while addressing more than 300 students and professors from Peking University, claimed: "If we acted in concert, it would be very difficult for the world to ignore us.” His aim was to lay a path for mutual understanding. This was reflected in China becoming India’s largest trading partner, and made inroads towards resolving the border issue. Sun Shihai, then Deputy Director with the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explained that "under the current complex and volatile international situation, this visit - to which both countries have attached great importance - will write a new chapter in Sino-Indian bilateral ties. It will promote a constructive partnership between the two Asian giants by adopting more mature and pragmatic approaches."

During this trip, Vajpayee was accompanied by a delegation of Indian businessmen and made two speeches reiterating the importance of trade as a bridge builder. One milestone came with the Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which reopened Nathu Lu in Sikkim as a trading pass. This marked the first time that China recognized Sikkim as a part of India, while India recognized Tibet as an autonomous region in China. Vajpayee also assured China that India would “not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-Chinese activity in India.” Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet were established as trade ports in commemoration of these significant changes to the two countries’ border policy. The agreements in 2003 went far beyond Panchsheel and constituted a true “mutual respect of territorial integrity.”

Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh remain unresolved, but the prospects for resolution looked bright. Though not an official treaty, the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation create a framework for future discussion on the issue. The Declaration mandated special representatives from each country to engage in border talks. Furthermore, it recommitted India and China to joint cooperation in order to promote the interests of developing countries, particularly in international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization. Notably, they voiced support for a multipolar world, one that would allow both countries to influence global matters in proportion to their geographic and demographic size.

The Declaration’s components thus echoed Nehru’s dream of “resurgent Asia.” They also re-called Panchsheel’s Five Principles, by aiming to create a “peaceful coexistence.” The Declaration explicitly stated that “[t]he common interest of the two sides outweighs their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other.” While it left the border question unanswered, the deal created a better setting in which it could be addressed, and reduced the probability of a future, border dispute based conflict.

Today, the two countries continue to cooperate in the international community, especially in their aim to make international organizations more reflective of increasing multipolarism. Publically, both countries avoid criticizing the other on sensitive issues. Despite the Western outcry about China’s presence in Tibet, India never publicly broached the issue. When Pakistan complained about Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir, China pressured Pakistan to drop its demands for a UN resolution on the subject. India and China try to keep their most contentious regional issues from becoming internationalized. Although it had taken over fifty years, India and China had finally identified their overlapping interests, cooperated towards achieving them and set the foundation for Nehru’s dream of a “resurgent Asia.”

Vajpayee’s remark that “you can change friends, but you cannot change neighbors” echoes a problem in any neighborly relationship, including that of India and China. Despite being scarred by the 1962 conflict and the relation relaions

tions reaching their lowest ever point following Pokhran II, Vajpayee built a bridge between countries in the form of increased trade, which could address the contentious border issue.

After witnessing the 1962 defeat and experiencing a warm welcome in 1979, Vajpayee reconsidered how to improve Sino-Indian relations. He realized that a country could only gain respect from others by being strong itself. Only if India was capable of protecting itself, could it be spared from outside humiliations. Therefore, Vajpayee insisted upon developing a nuclear power to make India credible in exercising its sovereignty without domination and fear. During the years Vajpayee served as the Prime Minister, he never stopped seeking a peaceful resolution for the border disputes with China. Furthermore, he managed to maintain a good relationship with China, and helped India to benefit from this relationship in terms of security, economics, and politics.

Another contribution to Vajpayee's successful leadership was his ability to see beyond the traditional zero-sum perspective in international relations. He did not see better relations with China as requiring a sacrifice of India's interests. He was quick to reconcile with China after the Pokhran II nuclear tests, without dismissing India’s aim to have nuclear technology. He assured China that India would acknowledge China's sovereignty over Tibet, but made that contingent on China’s acceptance of an Indian Sikkim. Vajpayee simultaneously pursued stronger ties with China and the US,

so that India could benefit from both partnerships, but not be overwhelmingly influenced by one side or the other. When the US-Chinese relationship was strained due to increased rivalry, Vajpayee, without taking a side, maintained good ties with both. Similarly, he did not consider China’s support of Pakistan to be a deal-breaker. His pragmatism enabled him to recognize that China was not going to reverse its policy overnight, and that no purpose was served by India having tense relations with China. Hence, it became all the more important to maintain cordial relations with neighboring countries.

Vajpayee succeeded in avoiding conflicts with China by building up trade ties to create common ground for cooperation in more problematic areas. India and China have since profited greatly from bilateral trade, with annual revenues in the billions. This economic foundation is perhaps the most effective way to prevent future military conflicts. Therefore, by paving the relationship on a financial footing, Vajpayee greatly improved Sino-Indian relations during his time as Prime Minister, and must be credited for having seemingly created lasting peace.

Timeline – India- China Relations (1947 – 2011)

August 15, 1947: India achieved its Independence.

October 1, 1949: People’s Republic of China is founded.

December 1949: India recognized the People’s Republic of China.

May 1951: Chinese-Tibetan treaty was signed. As per the treaty China would set up military and administrative committees in Tibet, the Tibetan army would be integrated into the Chinese army, and all of Tibet's external relations would be handled by China.

April 1954: Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and Tibet region of China signed by Nehru and Zhou Enlai in Beijing.

May 1954: India and China signed the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence, popularly known as Panchsheel.

June 1954: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India.

April 1955: Nehru and Zhou Enlai pledged to promote friendly ties at the Asian-African conference at Bandung.

November 1956: Zhou Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission.

April 1955: Nehru and Zhou Enlai pledged to promote friendly ties at the Asian-African conference at Bandung.

November 1956: Zhou Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission.

April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into Indian Territory. India's decision to grant asylum to him sours relations with Beijing. April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into Indian Territory. India's decision to grant asylum to him sours relations with Beijing.

May 1959: Vajpayee gives his speech on Tibet’s uprising and criticizes Nehru.

September 1959: Nehru tables, in Parliament, the first White Paper on India-China relations comprising notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China between April 1954 and August 1959.

April 1960: Discussions in New Delhi between Zhou Enlai and Nehru to address the boundary dispute fails

September – November 1962: Border War between India and China.

December 8, 1962: China sends a note signed by Zhou Enlai to India reiterating the three-point ceasefire formula. India accepted the ceasefire

October 16, 1964: China conducted its first nuclear explosion.

April 1965: China extends support to Pakistan, against war with India.

1970: Informal contacts between Indian and Chinese diplomats are established.

October 1971: The UN General Assembly votes to give China's seat in UN Security Councilto the Government of PRC, expelling Nationalist China functioning as the 'Republic of China' from Taiwan (Formosa).

December 1971: Sino-Indian relations suffer a setback following the creation of Bangladesh.

May 1974: India conducts its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion: “operation Smiling Buddha.”

April 1976: India and China decide to restore the level of diplomatic representation in both countries to the ambassadorial status after a 15-year diplomatic hiatus.

September 9, 1976: Mao Zedong passes away
March 1977: Janata Govt. comes to power in India and Vajpayee is appointed External Affairs minister

December 1978: Deng Xiaoping announces the “Open Door Policy of China.”

February 1979: External affairs Minister Vajpayee visits China.

February 17, 1979: China Vietnam conflict escalates. Vajpayee, who on his visit, cancels the remainder of his trip in protest.

February 20, 1979: Foreign Minister Vajpayee addresses the Parliament upon his return to India from China.

June 1981: Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hu visits India and the establishment of annual dialogue at the level of Vice-Ministers.

August 1984: Indian Commerce Secretary Abid Hussain signs the Most Favored Nation Agreement with the Chinese Vice-Minister Lu Xuejian in Beijing.

December 1988: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China. Agreement to set up a Joint Working Group on Boundary question and a Joint Group on Economic Relations, Trade, Science and Technology is signed.

December 1991: Chinese Premier Li Peng visits India after a gap of 31 years, pledges to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultations.

September 1993: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visits China, signs agreement on Border Peace and Tranquility and the establishment of the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist the work in Joint Working Group.

November 1996: Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits India, signs Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas.

May 1998: India conducts nuclear tests in Pokhran range in Rajasthan. China strongly condemns these nuclear tests.

July 1998: China urges India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear ambitions and sign the NPT.

August 1998: India officially announces talks with China on the reopening of the Ladakh-Kailash-Mansarovar route.

February 2000: India and China sign a bilateral trade agreement in Beijing to facilitate China's early entry into the WTO and also sign an MOU for setting up a Joint Working Group in the field of steel.

March 2000: India and China initiate the first ever bilateral security dialogue in Beijing on global and regional issues of mutual interest.

January 2001: India and China agree to joint counter terrorism together measures in an effort to maintain regional security and stability.

June 2002: China welcomes India's ambassador, Shiv Shankar Menon, visit to Tibet and hopes it will help in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship.

June 2003: Prime Minister Vajpayee visits China. Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation is signed. India and China conclude a border trade protocol to add a border crossing between Sikkim and the Tibet

May 19, 2004: Vajpayee completes his full term in office Autonomous Region.

May 19, 2004: Vajpayee completes his full term in office.

Vajpayee meets with Vice Premier of China Deng Xiao Ping at the great hall of people in Peking in February 1979 during his visit as external affairs minister.
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India

Vajpayee shakes hands with Foreign Minister of China Huang Hua, prior to Vajpayee’s departure from Peking to Shanghai on February 16, 1979.
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India

Vajpayee and Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao exchange greetings after the signing of the Agreement of Principal and Declaration of Cooperation at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, June 23, 2003.
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India

Vajpayee meets with Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the Chinese Military Commission and former President of China, in Beijing on June 24, 2003.